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MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
The Florida statute which governs the creation and priority of liens on
automobiles provides that a repairman may acquire a lien prior to all others
which accrue thereafter by performing labor on the machine with the consent
of the absolute or limited owner. 13 The statute only requires "limited owner-
ship" in order to create a relationship of privity between the owner and
mechanic, thus entitling the latter to a lien for repairs superior to the lien of
the conditional vendor.1 4 The court in the instant case interprets the term
"limited owner" to include a conditional vendee, in accord with the majority
view."5
The holding of the principal case conforms to earlier decisions on similar
cases affecting chattel mortgages on automobiles 16 and the priority of liens
on real property. 17
The purpose of the conditional sale is to give the buyer immediate use. Yet
the only method of obtaining protection that the conditional vendor now has,
from the tinie thaf the contract of sale is made and the date that it is re-
corded (four days in his case), is to keep possession of the automobile.
PLEADING-APPEALABILITY OF DECREE
ALLOWING ALIMONY PENDENTE LITE
Plaintiff, who was separated from her hushand, brought suit in equity
for maintenance and for support of the iminor children of the marriage. On
motion of the plaintiff, the court ordered temporary alimony to be paid by
the (ICfendant. pending outcome of the action. Defendant appealed from this
,wder. Plaintiff moved to dismiss the appeal on the ground that the order
was interlocutory and therefore non-appealable. field, motion denied. The
order for temporary alimony is a final decree from which an appeal will lie.
Hiss v. Hiss, 64 A.2d 173 (Conn. 1949).
The question of whether an independent review or appeal will lie
from an order denying or allowing aililiony pending the outcome of an action
for divorce, separation. or separate maintenance is one upon which unanimity
of decision is absent, although, perhaps, much desired.' 1-lere, the court stated
13. FLA. STAT. §§ 85.01, 85.07 (1941).
14. FL.A. STAT. § 85.25 (1941).
15. Chapnan v. St. Stephens Church. 105 Fla. 83, 10 So.2d 324 (1942); Gutnecht
v. Jolinson. o2 Cal. App.2d 315, 144 P.2d 854 (1944) ; Uitiversal Credit Co. v. Marks,
164 Md. 130. 163 Ad. 810 (1933); 15 Hernny. ENCYCLOPIA OF AuToMoBILE LAW 113
(9th ed. 1931). Contra: Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Spofford, 126 Me. 392,
138 Ad. 769 (1927).
16. Fritz v. Miami Industrial Bank, 143 Fla. 342, 196 So. 689 (1940) (mortgagee
with recorded mortgage has lien prior in dignity to garageman's liens for repairs).
17. Hub Supply Co. v. Bunedin Real Estate Co., 100 Fla. 47, 129 So. 904 (1930)
(mortgagee, not having recorded purchase money mortgage until after mechanic without
notice completed work, though mecharic's lien was filed subsequent to recording of
mortgage, held estopped to claim priority over mechanic's lien).
1. Kapp v. Kapp, 31 Nev. 70, 99 Pac. 1077 (1909).
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that this decree was final because the rights of some or all of the parties were
concluded and that further proceedings after the entry of the order or decree
could not affect them.2 In effect, the court held that the decree was one aris-
ing out of a proceeding which was wholly independent of the main action
for separation, in no way determined by it, and complete within itself.
3
It has been stated that the husband would have no relief in the final
decree if it should appear that he had suffered an injustice in the granting
of the temporary alimony, and, therefore, a decree granting alimony pendente
lite to the wife should be the subject of an appeal. 4 Essentially, many juris-
dictions regard this order to pay alimony as a money judgment,6 which may
be appealed as a matter of right. 6 In an unusual case, one court said that since
temporary alimony was ordered to be paid as a condition precedent to a
further hearing on the merits of the.main action, it must of necessity be
appealable.
7
Although it is in the interest of the state that all questionable features
of a divorce, separation, or separate maintenance action be fully investigated
through an appeal,8 some courts hold the order allowing or denying temporary
alimony to be merely an interlocutory 9 or interim order 10 that may be modi-
fied, changed, or vacated at any time before the final decree in the main
action is entered by the lower court, and, as such, not subject to an inde-
pendent appeal. These courts remark that since the object of temporary
alimony is to provide for the immediate wants of the wife, the allowance of
an apleal on such an order with the accompanying delay would, in many
cases, leave the wife without funds and force her to accept support at the
hands of charity.' 2 In these jurisdictions such an order is appealable, if at
all, only when the trial court has abused its discretion. As instances of such
2. E.g., Rutherford v. Rutherford, 152 Pa. Super. 517, 32 A.2d 921 (1943) (com-
mission for contem.it shows the final character of the order) ; Greer v. Greer, 110 Colo.
92, 130 P.2d 1050 (1942); State ex rel. Taylor v. Superior Court, 151 Wash. 568, 276
Pac. 866 (1929).
3. Sharon v. Sharon, 67 Cal. 185, 7 Pac. 456 (1885) (validity of the order for ali-
mony pendente lite does not depend in any way on the result of the divorce action) ;
Ahrens v. Ahrens, 299 Ky. 497, 185 S. W.2d 694 (1945) ; State ex reL. Gercke v. Seddon,
93 Mo. 520, 6 S. W. 342 (1887). Contra: Kapp v. Kapp, supra.
4. Sharon v. Sharon, surpra; accord, Hecht v. Hecht, 28 Ark. 92 (1872) (recovery
of the money paid by the husband would have passed beyond the power of the court);
In re Finkelstein, 13 Mont. 425, 34 Pac. 847 (1893).
5. Blake v. Blake, 80 Ill. 523 (1875) ; Brown v. Brown, 223 Ind. 463, 61 N. E.2d
645 (1845) ; Grairer v. Grairer, 200 La. 775, 8 So.2d 697 (1942).
6. Grairer v. Grairer, supro.
7. Schummer v. Schummer, 61 S. D. 305, 248 N. W. 492 (1933).
8. Dochelli v. Dochelli, 125 Conn. 465, 3 A.2d 666 (1939).
9. Duss v. Duss, 92 Fla. 1081, 111 So. 382 (1926) ; Keester v. Keester, 125 Ore. 60,
253 Pac. 12 (1927) ; Humphrey v. Humphrey, 98 Utah 596, 102 P2d 315 (1940).
10. State ex rel. Blackaby v. Cullison, 31 Okla. 187, 120 Pac. 660 (1912); Book V.
Book, 59 Wyo. 423, 141 P.2d 546 (1943).
II. Colby v. Colby, 200 La. 321, 7 So.2d 924 (1942); Gordon v. Gordon, 91 S. C.
245, 74 S. E. 360 (1912) ; accord, Miller v. Miller, 200 La. 43, 20 So.2d 419 (1944).
12. Duss v. Duss, 92 Fla. 1081, 111 So. 382 (1926) (alimony is the natural legal duty
of the husband to support his wifeand children) ; State ex rel. Blackaby v. Cullison, supra.
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abuse are rare, there is generally no right of appeal. 18 Since the order can be
vacated or modified by the trial court at any time before entry of a final
decree in the main action, an immediate appeal is refused, 14 but a few
jurisdictions allow an appeal from this interlocutory decree as an incident to
the appeal from the final decree; "I or by other prescribed procedures.' 6
The Pennsylvania courts are unique in their treatment of the order for
temporary alimony. Where a motion for alimony pendente lite has been
granted, an appeal is allowed, 17 but where such motion has been denied, an
appeal is not allowed.18 No clear reason is given by the courts for this dis-
tinction.1 9
Allowing an appeal in this situation may cause the wife to suffer hard-
ships by the stay of the order pending the outcome of the appeal. On the
other hand if no appeal is allowed, the wife is helpless until tle final decree
is entered; and with respect to the husband, he may he forced to pay an
unjustifiably large amount in the interim before the final decree. The most
equitable procedure is to allow an appeal in all instances, and to allow the
wife temporary alimony pending an appeal by the husband from a decree
allowing alimony pendente lite.29 In this way, the loss, if there be a loss, is
negligible, and it is placed, for the most part, on the party who can better
afford it.
PROCEDURE-CONSTRUCTION OF FLORIDA STATUTE RELATING
TO DEPOSITIONS AS INCLUDING WRITTEN INTERROGATORIES
After the declaration had been amended, defendants served written inter-
rogatories on the plintiJT. Plaintiff filed objections, alleging that the Florida
deposition statute contemplates the taking of oral depositions only and does
13. Kapp v. Kal), sutra; Abrams v. Rosenthal. 153 La. 459, 90 So. 32 (1923)
accord, Colby v. Colby, sifpri: Call v. Call, (;5 Me. 407 (1876) (to exceptions allowed
from trial court's discretion).
14. Kap v. Kapp, sritra; -arls v. Earls, 26 Kan. 178 (1881); Randall v. Randall,
156 Miss. 056, 126 So. 484 (1930L Coutra: Carroll v. Carroll, 48 L.a. Ann. 835, 19 So.
872 11896): Gordon v. Gordon, 91 S. C. 245, 74 S. E. 360 (1912).
15. tlay v. Hay, 40 Idaho 159, 232 Pac, 895 (1924): Hoerio v. Iloerio, 134 Pa. Super.
501, 4 A.2d 614 (1939) : Keester v. Keester, supra.
16,. Mancil v. Mancil, 240 Ala. 414, 199 So. 810 (1941) (midanius is the appro-
priate remedy) : Er parte ,lpperson, 235 Ala. 266. 178 So. 37 (1937) ; Clark v. Clark.
155 Fa. 574, 20 So.2d 900 (1945) (writ of certiorari) ; Grimes v. Posecai, 175 La. I, 142
So. 703 (1932) (inandanius).
17. Rutherford v. Rutherford, 152 Pa. Super. 517, 32 A2d 921 (1943).
18. Boerio v. Boerio, supro.
19, White v. White, 86 Cal. 212, 24 Pac. 1030 (1890) (with respect to the right
of appeal. o distinctioi between an order denying and an order allowing alimony
pendente lite) : accord, Wallace v. Wallace, 189 Ky. 451, 225 S. W. 31 (1920).
2(. People ex rel. Earle v. Circuit Court, 169 111, 201, 48 N. E. 717 (1897).
1. FLA. STAT. § 91.30 (1947). This act says biter alba, "Depositions in Chancery
anti Civil cases . . . arc permitted to be taken .. . lursisant to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure."
